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Abstract: 
We study the design of extended warranties in a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and an 
independent retailer. The manufacturer produces a single product and sells it exclusively through 
the retailer. The extended warranty can be offered either by the manufacturer or by the retailer. 
The party offering the extended warranty decides on the terms of the policy in its best interest 
and incurs the repair costs of product failures. We use game theoretic models to answer the 
following questions. Which scenario leads to a higher supply-chain profit, the retailer offering the 
extended warranty or the manufacturer? How do the optimum price and extended warranty 
length vary under different scenarios? We find that, depending on the parameters, either party 
may provide better extended warranty policies and generate more system profit. We also 
compare these two decentralized models with a centralized system where a single party 
manufactures the product, sells it to the consumer and offers the extended warranty. We also 
consider an extension of our basic model where either the manufacturer or the retailer resells the 
extended warranty policies of a third party (an independent insurance company, for example), 
instead of offering its own policy. 
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Abstract 
 We study the design of extended warranties in a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer 
and an independent retailer. The manufacturer produces a single product and sells it exclusively 
through the retailer. The extended warranty can be offered either by the manufacturer or by the 
retailer. The party offering the extended warranty decides on the terms of the policy in its best 
interest and incurs the repair costs of product failures. We use game theoretic models to answer 
the following questions. Which scenario leads to a higher supply-chain profit, the retailer 
offering the extended warranty or the manufacturer? How do the optimum price and extended 
warranty length vary under different scenarios? We find that, depending on the parameters, 
either party may provide better extended warranty policies and generate more system profit. We 
also compare these two decentralized models with a centralized system where a single party 
manufactures the product, sells it to the consumer and offers the extended warranty. We also 
consider an extension of our basic model where either the manufacturer or the retailer resells the 
extended warranty policies of a third party (an independent insurance company, for example), 
instead of offering its own policy.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Selling extended warranties on products is a highly profitable and rapidly expanding 
business. Extended warranties are offered on almost all consumer electronics and domestic 
appliances, ranging from laptop computers to washing machines and refrigerators. Berner (2004) 
notes that the profits from extended warranties accounted for almost half of Best Buy’s operating 
income and all of Circuit City’s operating income for the year 2003. Berner further notes that the 
profit margins on extended warranties are nearly 18 times higher than those on the products for 
these retailers.  
An extended warranty is actually a service plan, under which the provider promises to repair, 
replace, or maintain a product for free or at a lower price over a certain period of time after the 
manufacturer’s original warranty expires. The extended warranty may also offer additional 
benefits (such as return and/or exchange privileges) that are not provided by the original 
warranty. Extended warranties are sold separately from the products. Generally, an extended 
warranty can be offered by a manufacturer, a retailer, or by a third party (Publication 153, Better 
Business Bureau). The terms of a typical extended warranty specify the price and the length of 
time during which the product is covered. The provider of the extended warranty incurs the 
actual repair costs related to the warranty.  
The primary focus of this research is to analyze the design of extended warranties using a 
supply chain framework. We study a simple supply chain involving a single manufacturer and a 
single retailer. The manufacturer produces a single product and sells exclusively through the 
retailer. The extended warranty may be offered either by the manufacturer or by the retailer. The 
party offering the extended warranty decides on the terms of the policy in its best interest and 
incurs the repair cost when the product fails. Thus, the repair cost directly influences the 
provider’s extended warranty decisions. We use game theoretic models to answer the following 
questions. Which scenario leads to a higher supply chain profit, a retailer offering the extended 
warranty or the manufacturer? How do the optimum price and coverage length of the extended 
warranty vary under different scenarios? How is the total supply chain profit distributed between 
the parties in each scenario? We also compare these two situations with a centralized system, in 
which a single firm manufactures the product, sells directly to the end consumer, and offers the 
extended warranty. We also consider an extension of the basic model, where the manufacturer or 
Li, Kumpeg, Suman Mallik, and Dilip Chhajed. "Design of Extended Warranties in Supply Chains under Additive Demand." 
Production and Operations Management 21.4 (2012): 730-46. Publisher’s official version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1937-
5956.2011.01300.x. Open Access version:  http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/. 
Please share your stories about how Open Access to this item benefits you.  
 
 4 
the retailer resells the extended warranty policies of a third party (an independent insurance 
company, for example), instead of offering its own policy. We then compare the profits of the 
manufacturer/retailer between the two different ways of doing business: being an extended 
warranty provider or being a reseller.  
The scenarios described above are indeed found in practice. Many manufacturers offer 
extended warranties directly to the end consumers. GE Appliances offers extended warranties on 
almost all the products it manufactures. Firms like Ford, GM, JVC, and Apple have devoted 
whole divisions solely to managing and to serving extended warranty contracts (Padmanabhan 
1995). Retail stores such as Best Buy and Home Depot offer and promote third party extended 
warranties underwritten by insurers, and thereby act as extended warranty resellers. Sears is an 
example of a retailer that directly provides extended warranties*
In this paper, we use game theoretic models to analyze four scenarios: a retailer or a 
manufacturer being an extended warranty provider (model R; model M) and a retailer or a 
manufacturer being an extended warranty reseller for a third party provider (model 3R; model 
3M).  We first discuss and compare the extended warranty provider (EWP) models, model R and 
model M. We analyze the total channel profit as well as extended warranty decisions. In 
addition, we consider the consumer’s welfare in terms of the price per unit time of coverage. Our 
results show that, depending on the parameters, either model R or model M can provide higher 
channel profit and better coverage. We also discuss how the total channel profit is distributed 
between the manufacturer and the retailer in the two models. In addition, we compare the 
performance of the decentralized models with those of a centralized system and show that the 
centralized system always has the highest total profit, but does not necessarily offer the best 
consumer welfare. We next analyze the extended warranty reseller (EWR) models, model 3R 
. An example of a centralized 
system selling a product as well as managing the extended warranty is Dell. A customer can 
choose from a menu of extended warranties while customizing a computer at Dell’s website. It is 
difficult to find examples of a manufacturer reselling extended warranties, and we suggest some 
reasons in Section 5. 
                                                          
* Source: http://www.sears.com/shc/s/nb_10153_12605_NB_ProtectionAgreements?adCell=WF, 
retrieved on February 17, 2011. 
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and model 3M. Our analyses offer insights on when should a manufacturer or a retailer be a 
provider or a reseller of extended warranty.  
The extended warranties directly sold by third parties to consumers, though common in 
practice, are not a focus of this work. Such policies can be modeled as insurance policies, the 
design, pricing, and analysis of which have been well studied in the economics, insurance and 
risk management literatures (e.g., Lutz and Padmanabhan 1998, Manove 1983, Schlesinger 1983, 
and Taylor 1995). The extended warranty provider in our paper not only sells and administers the 
policy, but also influences the product retail price directly (in model R) or indirectly (through the 
product wholesale price in model M, and the extended warranty wholesale price in model 3R and 
model 3M). Our model thus allows us to study the interactions of the product decisions and the 
warranty decisions in a supply chain. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the related 
literature. We present our basic models (models R and M) and the solution procedures in Section 
3. In Section 4, we analyze the results and develop insights. Model 3R and model 3M are 
discussed in Section 5, while Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The research on design and analysis of extended warranty policies is limited. However, 
theories of product failure and warranties have received extensive attention in both the 
economics and operations management literatures.   
 
2.1 Economics/Marketing Literature 
Three distinct theories have been proposed in the economics literature to explain the 
existence of product warranties: the insurance theory, the signaling theory, and the incentive 
theory. Our paper relates closely to the insurance theory (first addressed by Heal, 1977), which 
assumes that consumers are more risk-averse than sellers, therefore warranties are provided to 
consumers as a form of insurance against product failure.  
The economics and marketing literature typically treats warranties as cash compensation paid 
to consumers in case of a product failure. This also applies to the sparse literature on extended 
warranties. The “insurance” view of warranty may be the result of consumer heterogeneity, as 
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mentioned by Hollis (1999) and as observed by Emons (1989) and Padmanabhan (1995). Self-
selection is usually adopted to deal with the consumer heterogeneity. Another example of such 
work is Lutz and Padmanabhan (1998). Warranties are also treated as monetary compensation in 
the empirical study by Padmanabhan and Rao (1993).  
Although warranties are a form of insurance, in practice, warranty contracts are usually 
specified by the time duration of coverage rather than by the amount of monetary payment. Our 
paper captures this feature of warranties and models the extended warranty as duration of time. 
This distinguishes our work from most extended warranty literature.  Although Hollis (1999) 
models warranty as time duration, unlike our work, his work deals with consumer heterogeneity 
and self selection.  
The paper that comes closest to our work is Desai and Padmanabhan (2004). They discuss 
the role of extended warranties in channel price coordination for a manufacturer, who sells a 
durable product through a retailer. They model the extended warranty as a reduced consumer 
liability when a product fails. The extended warranty is offered to the consumers directly either 
by the manufacturer or by an independent provider. They also consider a case where the 
manufacturer sells the extended warranty through the retailer. Our research differs from theirs as 
follows. 
• They only model scenarios where either the manufacturer or the independent party is the 
extended warranty provider. Our model allows the possibility of a retailer offering the 
extended warranty (model R), as often observed in practice. 
• Our paper focuses on the design of the extended warranties. Both the price and the length of 
the warranty are decision variables. Their work considers price only. 
• As indicated above, consistent with actual practice, we model the extended warranty as 
duration of time, and consider the number of product failures as well as the corresponding 
repair costs. Their paper follows the insurance approach and models the extended warranty as 
reduced monetary loss at a one-time product failure. 
 
2.2 Operations Management Literature 
The operations management literature on warranties considers four broad types of problems: 
(a) characterization of failure rates and warranty costs, (b) lifecycle models for products, where 
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warranty cost is a component of the product lifecycle cost, (c) inventory-warranty models, where 
the influence of warranties on inventory policies is considered, and (d) supply chain models that 
consider the impact of warranties on supply chain profits.  
Stream (a) focuses on mathematical models with considerable scope and details in the 
description of warranty costs. The product quality is usually modeled in conjunction with the 
product failure. Product life-time distribution and failure rate function are important components 
of the formulation of the warranty cost model. Mamer (1987) and Balcer and Sahin (1986) are 
good examples of such work. In addition, interested readers may refer to Sahin and Polatogu 
(1998) for an excellent review of various warranty policies and product failure models.  
In stream (b), Cohen and Whang (1997) are among the first to develop a normative model for 
entire life-cycle of a product. They incorporate warranty costs in the profit function of a firm 
seeking to maximize total lifecycle profit from a product. They assume that the warranty will run 
for a fixed interval and that the warranty cost is linear with the manufacturer’s quality of after-
sales service. However, the design or the management of the warranty is not the focus of their 
work. 
There are two research focuses in the inventory-warranty models of stream (c). One 
emphasizes repairs and recoveries of warranty returns in inventory systems. Khawam et al. 
(2007) and Mabini et al. (1992) investigate such warranty inventory systems. The other focuses 
on how incorporating warranty demand affects inventory planning. Huang et al. (2007) study a 
base-stock policy that is dependent on the number of units under warranty. Under such a policy, 
big cost improvements are shown over policies without considering warranty demand. Huang et 
al. (2008), includes age information about items under warranty in inventory planning, and 
shows even larger cost improvements. 
The supply chain models of stream (d) are relatively new. Heese (2010) explores the supply 
chain conflicts in the interactions between original product warranties and extended warranties. 
He considers a scenario where two competing manufacturers sell their products through a 
common retailer. If the retailer sells its own extended warranty, the manufacturers face a 
dilemma in setting their base warranties. While the manufacturers have incentives to provide a 
better warranty to make their product attractive to the customer, the retailer might prefer selling 
the products with lower warranty to enhance the sales of extended warranties. Heese develops a 
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model to determine and analyze optimal manufacturer and retailer strategies in this setting and 
shows that this dynamics exerts downward pressure on manufacturer warranties. He also 
explores extended warranty sales strategies and shows that a retailer can benefit from inducing 
customers to simultaneously consider product and extended warranties rather than pitching the 
extended warranties at checkout.  
Our work also falls in this last category of supply chain models. We study the design of 
extended warranties in a supply chain setting, which allows us to study product pricing and 
extended warranty design decisions within a unified context.   To the best of our knowledge, the 
design of the extended warranties in a supply chain context has not been studied before. 
 
3. EXTENDED WARRANTY PROVIDER MODELS  
In this section, we introduce the extended warranty provider (EWP) models, where either the 
manufacturer (model M) or the retailer (model R) offers the extended warranty directly to the 
consumers and incurs all associated costs. We are mostly interested in comparing these two 
models in terms of the total supply chain profit and its division between the manufacturer and the 
retailer. We also compare the optimal extended warranty lengths and prices between the two 
models. 
Consider a supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. The 
manufacturer produces a single product and sells it exclusively through the retailer at a wholesale 
price x. The retailer resells the product to the end consumer at a retail price p. The manufacturer 
offers the original product warranty, whose length is normalized to zero. This assumption 
enables us to focus exclusively on the analysis of the extended warranty. In either model, the 
specification of the extended warranty involves two components, which are decision variables 
for the party offering it: the length of the extended warranty in units of time, denoted by ew ; and 
its price, denoted by ep . During the lifetime of the extended warranty, the provider commits to 
offer free repair service for a failed product and incurs the associated repair costs. We will 
compare the two decentralized models (models R and M) with a centralized system, model C, 
where the manufacturer produces the product, sells directly to the end consumer, and offers the 
extended warranty.  
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Figure 1 schematically describes the three models along with their decision variables. The 
solid lines depict product decisions, while the dotted lines are for extended warranty decisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (a) Model C       (b) Model R       (c) Model M 
 
Figure 1: The EWP Models 
The Costs 
We assume that the manufacturing cost for the product is constant and is normalized to zero, so 
that the wholesale price is also the manufacturer’s product profit margin in the decentralized 
models. We assume that the number of product failures increases quadratically with time. The 
literature (Anderson 1977, Menke 1969, and Patankar and Worm 1981) often assumes that the 
number of failure increases exponentially with time. Our quadratic failure assumption captures 
the increasing rate of product failure with time, while retaining analytical tractability. A similar 
assumption has also been used in Heese (2010). Specifically, when an extended warranty of 
length we is offered, the number of product failures is 2ekw , where k is a constant. The cost of 
repair may differ from failure to failure. We use average of these repair costs. Let iγ  ( i = r, m 
representing the retailer and the manufacturer, respectively) denote the average cost of repair for 
party i. Thus, the cost of providing and managing the extended warranty of length we is 2ei wc , 
where ii kc γ=  for i = r, m.  
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Demand Functions 
There are two demand functions in our model, the product demand and the extended 
warranty demand.  First, consider the product demand. We assume that the demand is linearly 
decreasing in price: 
bpq −= 1 ,              (1) 
where p is the retail price of the product, q is the product demand, and b is the price sensitivity of 
the consumers. 
We next derive the demand function for the extended warranty. Note that only those 
consumers who buy the product are potential candidates for purchasing the extended warranty, 
i.e., the maximum demand for the extended warranty is limited by the product demand bp−1 . 
How should the demand for the extended warranty, denoted by eq , behave? Among the important 
characteristics, this demand should be decreasing in extended warranty price, and increasing in 
extended warranty length. In practice, extended warranties for the same product vary in price and 
duration of coverage; consumers consider both while evaluating an offering. Thus, the price per 
unit length of coverage, ee wp / , is an effective way to compare different extended warranties. 
Finally, if no extended warranty is offered, its demand should be zero. We use the simplest form 
of demand function that satisfies these properties and maintains tractability of the model. Let d 
denote the sensitivity of warranty demand to ee wp / . Then, the demand for the extended 
warranty is 
e
e
w
p
dbp −− )1( ,   if ew > 0;         (2) 
0 ,     if ew  = 0. 
 
Section 5.2 of the paper considers an extension where the demand of the extended warranty 
depends not only on its price but also on the product price. 
Desai and Padmanabhan (2004) derive a demand function for the extended warranty by 
considering the product-failure probability and the utilities of risk-averse consumers. Their 
resulting demand function is linear and is of the following form (Equation 8 in their paper): 
 21 kpkqq ee +−= , 
=eq  
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where, k1 and k2 are constants. Similar to that of Desai and Padmanabhan (2004), our demand 
function for the extended warranty is linear in its price. However, unlike their work, the length of 
the extended warranty is also a decision variable in our model. Our non-linear demand function 
captures the effect of the length of extended warranty on its demand. Lambertini and Orsini 
(2001) use a similar non-linear demand function to model the effect of product quality on 
demand. We also note that we have experimented (analytically or numerically when analytical 
work was not possible) with several other forms of demand functions including non-linear 
demand functions. The results from these demand functions are qualitatively similar to those 
from our current demand function indicating that the recommendations of our model are quite 
robust. Section 5.2 of the paper further elaborates on these alternative demand functions.  
We assume that there is no information asymmetry in the channel and that the manufacturer 
acts as a Stackelberg leader in the game. The manufacturer, therefore, can look ahead and 
anticipate the retailer’s product pricing decision, as well as his extended warranty decisions, if 
applicable.  
We will use subscripts and superscripts to facilitate the expression of the model variables.  
The superscripts will denote a model (C, R, or M); the subscripts r , m , 3, e, and .sys  will denote 
the retailer, the manufacturer, the third party, the extended warranty, and the system, 
respectively. We will also use the superscript “*” to denote optimal values. For example, ∗Rmπ  is 
the optimal profit of the manufacturer in model R, while Csys.π  is the system profit in model C. 
 
3.1 Model C: The Centralized System 
A centralized system maximizes the total supply chain profit by simultaneously considering 
the product and extended warranty demands. 
)1)(()1( 2
,,
e
e
eme
C
wpp w
p
dbpwcpbppMax
ee
−−−+−=π              (3) 
 
Model C can be solved by using standard optimization techniques.  Table 1 presents the optimal 
solutions to model C and the following two decentralized models, along with the optimal values 
of all decision variables. 
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3.2 Model R: Retailer Provides Extended Warranty  
In model R, besides the retail price p, the retailer also decides on the extended warranty terms 
by specifying ep  and ew . In the first stage of the game, the manufacturer chooses the wholesale 
price x  that maximizes her profit.  The optimization problem of the manufacturer is given by: 
)1( bpxMax Rmx −=Π .                 (4) 
In the second stage, taking the wholesale price as given, the retailer maximizes his own profit.  
The retailer’s problem is as follows. 
)1)(()1)(( 2
,,
e
e
ere
R
rwpp w
p
dbpwcpbpxpMax
ee
−−−+−−=π                      (5) 
 
We solve the model starting with the retailer’s problem and working backwards. Noting that 
the second order conditions for the maximization problems are satisfied, the three first order 
necessary conditions of the optimization problem in (5) can be solved simultaneously to yield the 
retailer’s best response retail price p*(x) in terms of the manufacturer’s wholesale price x. The 
optimal wholesale price of the manufacturer can then be found by substituting this best response 
function into the manufacturer’s profit maximization problem in (4) and optimizing with respect 
to the wholesale price. Once the optimal wholesale price is known, the optimal values of all other 
decision variables can be found from the first order conditions of the optimization problem in 
(5). 
 
3.3 Model M: Manufacturer Provides Extended Warranty  
In the first stage of the game, the manufacturer chooses the wholesale price x , and the 
extended warranty terms ( ep , ew ). In the second stage, the retailer takes the manufacturer’s 
decisions as given and sets the retail price p . The manufacturer’s optimization problem is as 
follows. 
)1)(()1( 2
,,
e
e
eme
M
mwpx w
p
dbpwcpbpxMax
ee
−−−+−=π             (6) 
In the second stage, given the manufacturer’s decisions, the retailer solves for p : 
)1)(( bpxpMax Mrp −−=Π .               (7) 
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The solution procedure for model M is similar to that of model R.   
 
4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This section is divided into two sub-sections. Section 4.1 discusses the optimal design of the 
variables defining the extended warranty. We also elaborate on the interactions between the 
product market and the extended warranty market. Section 4.2 analyzes the profits of different 
parties offering the extended warranty. The results answer an important question: which model 
provides a higher supply chain profit? Our analyses are based on the optimal values of the 
decision variables summarized in Table 1. 
 
4.1 Extended Warranty Design 
 
Observation 1: The extended warranty sensitivity parameter, d, must be higher than certain 
threshold values for the feasibility of each of the three models, C, M, and R. 
 
The conditions for the feasibility of the three models, C, M, and R, are mcbd 9/≥ , 
mcbd 36/≥ , and rcbd 12/≥ , respectively. Similar requirements can be found in Gupta and 
Loulou (1998), and Savaskan et al. (2004). Observation 1 has interesting implications. The 
feasibility conditions are harder to satisfy when the product price sensitivity b is high and the 
repair cost is low. Such might be the case with products such as telephones and small kitchen 
appliances. As a result, an extended warranty is rarely offered on such products. On the other 
hand, the feasibility conditions are easily satisfied when the product price sensitivity b is low and 
the repair cost is high. The examples of such products are flat screen televisions, cars, and high-
end camcorders, for which extended warranties are rather common. 
Henceforth, we assume that the conditions described in Observation 1 are satisfied. We next 
characterize the properties of the optimal price and optimal length of the extended warranty. 
 
Proposition 1: For the three models, C, M, and R, the optimal price and the optimal length of 
the extended warranty are 
(a) decreasing in the repair cost ci, and the sensitivity parameter d. 
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(b) increasing in the product price sensitivity parameter b. 
 
The proofs of all results are included in the Appendix.  
For a given price, as the repair cost increases, the provider reduces the coverage duration of 
the extended warranty. The price of the warranty also decreases in order to counter the reduction 
in demand due to the shorter duration. According to The Wall Street Journal, DaimlerChrysler 
reduced the extended warranty on its vehicles from 2006 because of higher repair costs resulting 
from higher labor costs and complicated technology (Saranow 2005).  The findings of our model 
directly support this action.  
The effect of a change in the parameter d is similar to that of the repair cost. As d increases, 
the demand for extended warranty goes down. A lower extended warranty price is necessary to 
counter this effect. Consequently, the duration of extended warranty decreases. It is easy to show 
that an increase in d (or the repair cost) also results in an increase of the product wholesale and 
retail prices. Under this scenario, a provider attempts to offset the lost revenue from extended 
warranty through additional revenue from the product sales. 
What is the effect of changes in the product price sensitivity parameter? In absence of an 
extended warranty, both product price and demand would be decreasing in b. But with extended 
warranty, as b increases, the product retail price decreases and this decrease is large enough to 
produce an increase in the product demand. This, in turn, increases the size of the potential 
market for the extended warranty. Thus, a higher price can be charged for the extended warranty 
with a longer duration. 
Finally, it is important to clarify the distinction between Observation 1 and Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1 examines the sensitivity of the optimal solutions with respect to the model 
parameters in the region of feasibility, whereas Observation 1 simply imposes technical limits for 
the feasibility of our model. 
The optimal extended warranty prices are not directly comparable across the three models as 
the optimal durations are different. We therefore compare the price per unit length of coverage,
** / ee wp , across the three models.  
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Proposition 2: Model M has the lowest extended warranty price per unit length of coverage, 
unless mr cc 3> , in which case model R has the lowest price per unit length of coverage. In 
particular, when the repair costs of the manufacturer and the retailer are equal, the extended 
warranty price per unit length of coverage is highest for model C and is lowest for model M.  
 
It is important to emphasize that price per unit length of coverage, 
** / ee wp , is simply a construct 
that allows us to compare the three models. This ratio is not a decision variable for any provider 
of the extended warranty. This precludes the possibility of offering an infinitesimal warranty to 
maximize this ratio. It can be thought of as a measure of the value of the extended warranty to a 
consumer.  
Per Proposition 2, both model M and model R are potential candidates for the lowest price 
per unit length of coverage. Consumers get the best value in terms of price per unit length of 
coverage when the extended warranty is provided by the manufacturer, unless the retailer’s 
repair cost is substantially higher than that of the manufacturer. Why does this happen? The 
retailer in model R directly influences the demand of the product and the extended warranty by 
choosing the respective prices. The control over all three key decision variables (the product 
price, the extended warranty price, and the length of the extended warranty) allows the retailer to 
charge a higher warranty price per unit length of coverage. However, this advantage wears off as 
the repair cost of the retailer goes up. In fact, it is easy to establish that the ratio 𝑝𝑒
∗
𝑤𝑒∗
  is decreasing 
in the repair cost of the provider (see proof of Proposition 2). Therefore, a substantial 
disadvantage in repair cost (i.e., mr cc 3> ) eventually outweighs the benefit of setting product 
and warranty prices simultaneously. Under this scenario, model R has the lowest extended 
warranty price per unit length of coverage. Model C, being a centralized model, allows the 
provider to charge the highest price per unit length of coverage, and consequently provides the 
worst value to the customer. 
Under most circumstances, the repair cost of the retailer is unlikely to be three times larger 
than that of the manufacturer, implying that model M is often likely to have the lowest extended 
warranty price per unit length of coverage. Direct support of this finding can also be found in the 
popular business press. According to Business Week (Armstrong 2004), electronics retailer 
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CompUSA charged $369.99 for a three-year extended warranty plan on a Toshiba Satellite 
laptop computer, while the manufacturer Toshiba Corp. charged only $199 for a better plan. 
Consumer experts often recommend buying an extended warranty directly from a manufacturer. 
Proposition 2 supports this recommendation.  
While price per unit length of coverage ( ** / ee wp ) allows us to compare the warranty offerings 
in the three models, the aggregate measure of welfare from a purchase is formally measured by 
consumer surplus (CS). How does the consumer surplus from the product and the extended 
warranty purchase vary across the three models? It is easy to establish that when the repair costs 
of the manufacturer and the retailer are equal, model C offers the highest consumer surplus while 
model M offers the lowest (CSC ≥ CSR ≥ CSM). Per proposition 2, when the repair costs are 
equal, the ratio  𝑝𝑒
∗
𝑤𝑒∗
 is highest for model C and is lowest for model M. These two results together 
suggest an interesting interaction between the product and warranty sales. The product price is 
lowest in model C and is highest in model M ( *** CRM ppp >> ). As a result, the demand for the 
product, and hence the potential demand for the extended warranty, is highest for model C and is 
lowest for model M. Furthermore, the product demand in model C is so high that it results in the 
highest demand for the extended warranty (it is easy to establish from Table 1 that qe*C ≥ qe*R ≥ 
qe*M) in spite of having the most costly extended warranty in terms of unit length of coverage. 
This high demand results in highest CS for model C. 
How do the product prices compare across model R and model M? Using the expressions 
from Table 1, it is easy to show that the centralized system offers the lowest product retail price. 
Furthermore, the product retail price in model R is higher than that in model M (i.e., ** MR pp > ) 
if and only if cr > 3cm. This implies that when the repair costs of the manufacturer and the retailer 
are equal, the product retail price is highest when the manufacturer offers the extended warranty 
and lowest when the supply chain is centralized ( *** CRM ppp >> ). Thus, the product and the 
extended warranty prices per unit length of coverage exhibit opposite relationships across the 
three models. 
An intuitive explanation is as follows. A lower product price results in a higher demand for 
the product and a higher potential market size for the extended warranty which allows a provider 
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to charge a higher price for the extended warranty per unit coverage. When the manufacturer 
offers the extended warranty, the retailer, in setting the product price, is not concerned about the 
potential demand for the extended warranty and thus the price is higher.  
 
4.2 Profit Analysis 
 In this sub-section, we compare the system profit for the three models, and examine the 
division of total profits between the manufacturer and the retailer. We define the system profit 
(or the supply chain profit) of any model as the sum of profits of the retailer and the 
manufacturer. Obviously, the centralized model C yields the highest system profit amongst the 
three models, as can be verified using the expressions from Table 1. As a result, we will restrict 
our attention to only model R and model M in this sub-section. 
 
Theorem 1: The optimal system profit of model M is higher than that of model R ( ∗∗ > RsysMsys .. ππ ) 
if and only if the repair cost of the retailer, cr, is higher than a threshold value s∆ , where s∆  is 
larger than mc . In particular, when rm cc = , 
∗∗ > Msys
R
sys .. ππ . 
 
The threshold s∆ is a function of the parameters b, d, and cm. The proof of Theorem 1 provides 
the analytical expression for it. 
Theorem 1 reveals an interesting supply chain dynamics. When the repair costs of the 
manufacturer and the retailer are equal, the retailer offering the extended warranty yields a 
higher system profit compared to the scenario where the manufacturer offers the extended 
warranty. Why? In model R, the retailer decides p , ep  and ew , while the manufacturer decides 
the wholesale price x. Thus, the retailer can simultaneously manipulate all three variables to 
maximize profits. These three variables allow him to directly influence the product demand as 
well as the extended warranty demand. On the other hand, when the manufacturer offers the 
extended warranty (model M), the retailer still determines the product retail price. The product 
price, in turn, determines its demand and maximum potential for the extended warranty. Under 
this scenario, the retailer has no incentive to control the double marginalization in the channel 
and the manufacturer has no mechanism to control it. This results in a lower supply chain profit. 
Theorem 1 further shows that a better system profit can be obtained if the extended warranty is 
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offered by the retailer, instead of the manufacturer, even when the repair cost of the retailer is 
higher than that of the manufacturer as long as it is not too high ( src ∆< ). Our extensive 
numerical experiment indicates that as the product price sensitivity parameter b increases, so 
does s∆ . Thus, as the customers become more price sensitive, an extended warranty offered by 
the retailer will generate higher system profit even if the repair cost of the retailer goes up. When 
the retailer’s repair cost increases beyond the threshold value of s∆ , the cost advantage of model 
M outweighs the structural advantage (i.e., reduced double marginalization) of model R and 
hence, model M generates a better system profit. 
We next look at the division of profit between the manufacturer and the retailer within a 
model, as well as between the two models. 
 
Proposition 3: 
(a) Comparison between model R and model M:  
(i) Manufacturer’s profit: ∗∗ ≤ Mm
R
m ππ if and only if mr cc 3≥ . 
(ii) Retailer’s profit: ∗∗ ≤ Mr
R
r ππ if and only if cr is greater than a threshold value r∆ , where r∆  
is larger than mc . 
(iii) In particular, when rm cc = , we have 
∗∗ > Mm
R
m ππ  and 
∗∗ > Mr
R
r ππ . 
 
(b) Comparison within model R and model M:  
(i) In model R, the profit of the manufacturer is higher than that of the retailer when 
28.11 dcb r< , and is lower than that of the retailer when 
22 128.11 dcbdc rr << . 
(ii) In model M, profit of the manufacturer is higher than that of the retailer when 275.33 dcb m<
, and is lower than that of the retailer when 22 3675.33 dcbdc mm << . 
 
The threshold r∆ is a function of the parameters b, d, and cm . An analytical expression for r∆  
can be found in the proof of Proposition 3(a). 
The proposition shows that, unless the manufacturer has a substantially lower repair cost, 
both the retailer and the manufacturer are better off with the retailer offering the extended 
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warranty. Thus, under comparable repair costs, an extended warranty offered by a retailer not 
only generates a higher system profit (Theorem 1), but also makes both retailer and manufacturer 
better off than they would be if the manufacturer offered the warranty. Why does this happen? 
When the retailer offers the extended warranty, as discussed after Theorem 1, the double 
marginalization in the channel is lower than that when the manufacturer offers the extended 
warranty. This results in a higher demand for the product and the extended warranty for model R. 
Using the expressions from Table 1, it is easy to verify that for rm cc = , 
** MR qq ≥ and 
** M
e
R
e qq ≥ . It can further be shown that when the two repair costs are equal, the manufacturer’s 
wholesale price is lower in model R compared to that in model M. Thus, the benefit of reducing 
the double marginalization in the channel is so significant that the manufacturer’s profit from the 
product alone at a lower wholesale price (model R) is more than that of selling the product at a 
higher wholesale price and selling the extended warranty (model M). The retailer too enjoys a 
higher profit under model R because of higher demands for the product and the extended 
warranty compared to model M. These insights can serve as a useful qualitative guideline for the 
practitioners responsible for setting up or running extended warranty businesses. It also implies 
that an extended warranty can be used strategically to reduce the double marginalization in a 
supply chain. 
Are the findings in Proposition 3(a) consistent with observed practices? Warranty Week, 
a major trade publication for the industry professionals, noted in its October 25, 2005 issue that 
on an aggregate basis, most extended warranties in the Unites States are sold by retailers 
(Source: http://www.warrantyweek.com/archive/ww20051025.html, retrieved on May 17, 2009). 
Warranty Week further noted in its January 19, 2005 issue that the manufacturers account for 
only 37.2% of the total market of the extended warranty administrators in the USA (Source: 
http://www.warrantyweek.com/archive/ww20050119.html, retrieved on May 17, 2009). These 
observations, once again, support the assertion in Proposition 3(a).  
Proposition 3(b) states that, in both models M and R, the manufacturer’s profit is higher 
than that of the retailer for lower values of the product price sensitivity parameter b. The 
manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader in our model. She optimizes her profit by anticipating the 
retailer’s decisions, and is able to obtain a higher share of the system profit. However, when b 
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becomes large, the customers become more price sensitive, and a large part of supply chain 
profit is derived from the product sales, giving the retailer more profit.  
 
To provide or not to provide the extended warranty 
During the 1980s extended warranties were offered only on large and expensive items. Today 
extended warranties are common on almost all durable goods. What are the profit implications of 
offering an extended warranty? We explore the answer to this question next. To accomplish our 
objective we compare our model with a base case where no extended warranties are sold (i.e., 
the manufacturer produces the product and sells it to the retailer at wholesale price and the 
retailer resells the product to the consumer at retail price). Under such a scenario models R and 
M are identical and that the system profit, the retailer profit, and the manufacturer profit are 
respectively, 3/(16b), 1/(16b), and 1/(8b). The system profit for model C is 1/(4b). We define the 
rate of profit improvement due to the extended warranty as the difference between the profit 
under the extended warranty and under the base case, expressed as a fraction of the base-case 
profit.  
 
Proposition 4:  
(a) For the system profit, model C has the highest rate of profit improvement due to the extended 
warranty. Model R has the smallest rate of profit improvement due to the extended warranty 
if and only if cr is greater than a threshold value s∆ , where s∆  is greater than mc . In 
particular, when cr = mc , model M has the smallest rate of profit improvement due to the 
extended warranty. 
(b) In both models M and R, the retailer’s rate of profit improvement due to the extended 
warranty is higher than that of the manufacturer. 
 
The threshold s∆ is a function of the parameters b, d, and cm. An analytical expression is 
provided in the proof.  
Proposition 4(a) shows that, providing an extended warranty improves the system profit more 
when it is sold by the retailer rather than the manufacturer, unless the retailer’s repair cost is 
Li, Kumpeg, Suman Mallik, and Dilip Chhajed. "Design of Extended Warranties in Supply Chains under Additive Demand." 
Production and Operations Management 21.4 (2012): 730-46. Publisher’s official version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1937-
5956.2011.01300.x. Open Access version:  http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/. 
Please share your stories about how Open Access to this item benefits you.  
 
 21 
substantially larger than that of the manufacturer. When the retailer offers the extended warranty, 
he keeps the product price low to expand the potential market for the extended warranty, which 
in turn reduces the double marginalization in the channel resulting in a higher rate of profit 
improvement for model R. Proposition 4 shows that this reduction in double marginalization can 
even overcome some repair cost disadvantage for the retailer. However, when the retailer has a 
substantial repair cost disadvantage, model M offers better rate of profit improvement. 
Under the base case, the manufacturer’s profit is twice that of the retailer. However, with an 
extended warranty, the retailer’s profit increases at a faster rate than that of the manufacturer. 
Indeed, as Proposition 3(b) indicates, when the price sensitivity parameter b is sufficiently large, 
the retailer’s profit can even surpass the manufacturer’s profit. This indicates that a retailer 
stands to gain more from an extended warranty than a manufacturer. This might explain why 
retailers are so actively involved in the extended warranty business across various industries. 
 
5. EXTENSIONS 
 Our discussion thus far has focused on the case where either the manufacturer or the 
retailer underwrites the warranty and incurs costs associated with product failure. The objective 
of this section is two-fold: to explore an extension of our model to allow third-party extended 
warranties, and to study the robustness of our key findings under alternative demand functions. 
To accomplish our first objective, we explore an extension of our basic model, where the 
manufacturer or the retailer simply resells the extended warranty policies of a third party 
underwriter. We call these models the extended warranty reseller models (EWR) as opposed to 
the extended warranty provider models discussed thus far. As discussed in Section 1, Best Buy, 
CompUSA, and other retailers are often the resellers of the extended warranties from third party 
underwriters such as AIG, GE, and American Home Shield. Section 5.1 discusses these models. 
To accomplish our second objective, we show in Section 5.2 that the key findings of our paper 
continue to hold under various alternative demand functions and even when the demand of the 
extended warranty depends on the product price. We also discuss the limitations of our model. 
 
5.1 Extended Warranty Reseller Models 
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In analyzing the EWR models, we keep the basic structure of our model unchanged, implying 
that the manufacturer still produces a single product and sells it exclusively through the retailer 
and that the manufacturer sets the product wholesale price while the retailer sets the retail price. 
However, the manufacturer or the retailer in the EWR models buys the extended warranty 
underwritten by a third party, and resells the policy to the end consumer at a retail price. The 
third party is responsible for managing the extended warranty, and decides on its length ew  and 
wholesale price xe in its best interest. The manufacturer or the retailer sets the retail price pe of 
the extended warranty. 
We consider two EWR models, model 3R, where the retailer is the reseller, and model 3M, 
where the manufacturer is the reseller. Our objectives in this sub-section are two-fold: to 
compare the EWP and EWR models and to compare the two EWR models. The first comparison 
yields insights about whether it is more profitable for a manufacturer or a retailer to be a provider 
over a reseller of the extended warranty. The second comparison provides structural insights 
about the 3M and 3R models. 
We model the EWR scenario as a three-stage game. In the first stage, as the Stackelberg 
leader, the manufacturer decides on the product wholesale price. In the second stage, the third 
party makes the extended warranty decisions (the length and the wholesale price of the extended 
warranty) after observing the product and evaluating the average repair cost 3c . Finally, the retail 
prices of the product and the extended warranty are determined simultaneously. The retailer 
decides on the product retail price, while the retail price of the extended warranty is set by either 
the manufacturer (Model 3M) or the retailer (Model 3R). 
 
Model 3R 
In the first stage of the game, the manufacturer optimizes her profit by deciding the product 
wholesale price x : 
)1(3 bpxMax Rmx −=Π .                 (8) 
In the second stage, the third party maximizes her profit by simultaneously deciding the 
wholesale price xe and the length ew of the extended warranty  
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In the last stage, taking the length of the extended warranty, and the wholesale prices of the 
product and the extended warranty as given, the retailer simultaneously chooses the retail price 
of the product p, and the extended warranty retail price ep  to maximize his profit.  The retailer’s 
problem is as follows. 
)]/()1[()()1)((3
, eeee
R
rpp
wpdbpxpbpxpMax
e
−−⋅−+−−=Π                 (10) 
We solve for the model using standard methodology by working backwards, starting from the 
retailer’s problem in the last stage. Note that a special case of model 3R is the scenario where a 
retailer resells the extended warranty provided by the manufacturer. Desai and Padmanabhan 
(2004) report that Ford and Apple often use such arrangements. 
Model 3M has a similar formulation and solution methodology and hence is omitted. The 
optimal solutions of the two models 3M and 3R are presented in Table 2. 
 
Being a Provider vs. Being a Reseller 
We compare the optimal profits of models 3M and 3R with those of models M and R 
respectively. This gives us insights about whether it is more profitable for a manufacturer or a 
retailer to be a reseller of the extended warranty instead of being a provider.  
 
Proposition 5:  
(a) The manufacturer gets a higher optimal profit by being a provider of the extended warranty 
if and only if 34ccm < . 
(b) The retailer gets a higher optimal profit by being a provider of the extended warranty if and 
only if 3∆<rc , where ∆3 is a function of  the parameters b, d, and c3. 
 
The analytical expression for the threshold 3∆  can be found in the proof. 
Proposition 5(a) shows that a manufacturer is better off being a provider unless her repair 
cost is substantially higher ( 34ccm ≥ ) than that of the third party. A manufacturer is likely to 
have better knowledge of her product, implying her repair cost is likely to be lower than, or 
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comparable to, that of the third party. Thus, the relationship 34ccm <  is likely to hold in practice. 
Therefore, being a provider is often the preferred way of offering extended warranty for a 
manufacturer. This is usually the case with the auto manufacturers, as discussed in Section 1. As 
afore mentioned and in consistent with Proposition 5(a), it is difficult to find an example where a 
manufacturer resells third-party extended warranties.  
Proposition 5(b) describes the necessary and sufficient conditions for the retailer to be a 
provider of the extended warranty. Our numerical experiments indicate that the numerical value 
of 3∆  falls in the range of 32.1 c ~ 35.2 c  for a wide range of values of the problem parameters. 
(We experimented with 100 scenarios by varying the price sensitivities b and d from 0.1 to 1 
with a step of 0.1. The largest value of 3∆  is 3493.2 c , and the smallest is 3202.1 c , with most of 
the values above 32c .) Note that the retailer’s condition for being a reseller in Proposition 5(b) is 
less restrictive than the manufacturer’s in Proposition 5(a). In addition, a retailer might not have 
expertise in repairing the product from a manufacturer. Propositions 5(a) and 5(b) thus indicate 
that in practice, a retailer is more likely to be the reseller of an extended warranty than a 
manufacturer is. The examples in Section 1 support this notion.  
 Note that double marginalization is present in both channels in the EWR models: the 
product channel and the extended warranty channel. Comparing the two models M and 3M we 
see that when a manufacturer chooses to be a provider, she eliminates double marginalization in 
the warranty channel. This allows the manufacturer to use the resulting savings to lower the 
wholesale price of the product. It is easy to verify from Tables 1 and 2 that *3* MM xx ≤ . The 
lower wholesale price allows the retailer to charge a lower retail price for the product, resulting 
in higher demands for the product and the warranty. This benefits both the retailer and the 
manufacturer. Thus, a manufacturer prefers to be a provider of the warranty unless the cost 
disadvantage is overwhelming (cm < 4c3 in our model). Comparing the two models R and 3R we, 
once again, see that the retailer can eliminate the double marginalization in the warranty channel 
by choosing to be provider. However, unlike the models M and 3M, this does not benefit the 
manufacturer. The manufacturer maintains a higher wholesale price in this scenario, affecting the 
retailer’s profit. As a result, a retailer chooses to be a reseller when the repair cost goes up and 
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that critical value of the repair cost for switching from provider to reseller is lower for the 
retailer. 
We conclude this section by noting that the scenario where a third party offers extended 
warranty directly to a consumer is beyond the scope of our paper. Such a scenario can easily be 
modeled as an insurance policy and is well studied in the literature of risk and insurance 
management (e.g., Lutz and Padmanabhan 1998, Manove 1983, Schlesinger 1983, and Taylor 
1995). 
 
Numerical Study: A Comparison of the two EWR Models 
In this section, we present a numerical study to compare the two EWR models with respect to 
optimal price, demand, and profit. As the reader will see, the relationships between models 3M 
and 3R are qualitatively similar to those between models M and R, implying that the presence of 
a third party underwriter does not change the structural properties of our model.  
The optimal solutions of the models 3R and 3M are summarized in Table 2. It is hard to 
compare the optimal solutions of these two models analytically. As a result, we numerically 
obtained the optimal solutions of the two models under various representative values of the 
model parameters.  We choose the third party’s repair cost 3c = 5 (other feasible values of repair 
cost yield similar results) and let the price sensitivities b and d vary from 0.2 to 1 at a step of 0.4. 
Our numerical findings are summarized in Figures 3(a) – 3(g). In each of these figures we plot 
the difference between the optimal solutions of the models 3R and 3M for different values of the 
demand sensitivity parameters b and d. These figures are straightforward. As a result, we simply 
summarize our findings in the following two observations. 
 
Observation 2:  
(a) The optimal retail prices of the product in model 3R are always lower than those in model 
3M (i.e., ∗∗ < MR pp 33 ). 
(b) The optimal extended warranty prices per unit length of time in model 3R are always higher 
than those in model 3M (i.e., M
e
eR
e
e
w
p
w
p 3
*
3
* )()(
∗∗
> . 
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Observation 3:  
(a) The optimal profits of the retailer, the manufacturer, and the third party warranty provider 
are higher in model 3R than those in model 3M, implying model 3R gives rise to a better 
system profit than model 3M (i.e., ∗Rr
3π  > ∗Mr
3π , ∗Rm
3π  > ∗Mm
3π , ∗R33π  > 
∗M3
3π , and 
∗R
sys
3
.π  > 
∗M
sys
3
.π ).   
(b) In the two models 3R and 3M, the optimal profit of the manufacturer is always higher than 
that of the retailer (i.e., ∗Rm
3π   > ∗Rr
3π  and ∗Mm
3π   > ∗Mr
3π ). 
 
The relationships between models 3R and 3M in Observations 2 and 3 are similar to those 
between the models R and M for rm cc =  . (Note that the repair costs in models 3R and 3M are 
identical and equal to that of the third party). Thus, the presence of the third party does not 
significantly change the structure of our model. The intuitions behind these results have been 
discussed in detail in Section 4. 
 
5.2 Sensitivity of Results with respect to Alternative Demand Functions 
We discuss several alternative demand functions in this sub-section. First we consider the 
case where the demand of the extended warranty depends on product price. Then we present four 
other demand functions. 
 
Demand of the Extended Warranty Depends on Product Price 
In this section, we extend our basic model into a more complex scenario, where product price 
not only influences the maximum potential demand of the extended warranty ( bp−1 ), but also 
has a direct impact on the extended warranty demand. Many consumers choose to buy extended 
warranties on expensive products such as cars, flat screen televisions etc., while few consumers 
buy extended warranties on products such as telephones or sewing machines. This observation 
suggests that the demand for the extended warranty relative to the product demand should be 
increasing with the product price. Our demand function in equation (2) readily accommodates 
such as extension by letting the parameter d to be a function of the product price p, i.e.,  
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e
e
e w
p
pdbpq )()1( −−= ,  0,0)( >≤′ ewpd . 
We choose pdpd /)( = , where d is a constant, and write the demand function for the extended 
warranty as 
0,)1( >−−= e
e
e
e wforpw
dp
bpq . 
Note that this demand function satisfies the desired characteristics discussed in Section 3. 
We solve the three models numerically and compare the insights with our original model. We 
choose the sensitivity parameter d  equal to 0.4 and 0.7, and let the price sensitivity b  vary from 
1.05 to 1.5 in steps of 0.05, while the repair cost ic  varies from 0.05 to 4.0 in steps of 0.1. We 
seek the optimal solutions under the combinations of the parameters discussed. Our main 
findings are presented in Figures 4(a) – 4(d). Figure 4(a) shows how the extended warranty price 
per unit length of coverage, ee wp / , vary across the three models C, M, and R when the repair 
costs of the retailer and the manufacturer are equal. This finding is consistent with that in 
Proposition 2. Similarly, Figure 4(b) validates Theorem 1 for the more general modeling 
framework while Figures 4(c) and 4(d) validates Proposition 3(a). This suggests that the findings 
of our model are quite robust and that the key insights of our original model remain unchanged 
even when we let the demand of the extended warranty depend on the product price. 
 
Alternative Demand Functions 
While we have used the simplest form of demand function that satisfies the desirable 
properties and maintains analytical tractability, to check the robustness of our model, we have 
repeated our calculations and analyses (analytical or numerical when analytical calculations were 
not tractable) for each of the following alternative demand functions: 
eee fwdpbpq +−−= 1 ,        (11) 
eee wfdpbpq /1 −−−= ,         (12) 
e
e
e w
dp
bpq −−=1 , and        (13) 
eee wfdpbpq +−−= 1         (14) 
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Each of these demand functions satisfies the desirable properties of the extended warranty 
demand described in Section 3. Unlike our demand function in (2), each of the demand functions 
in (11), (12), and (14) allows different sensitivities for the price and the length of the warranty. 
We also test for both linear (equation 11) and non-linear (equations 12-14) relationships and 
allow complex relationship between the demand and length of the extended warranty by 
experimenting with four different exponents (-1.0, -0.5, 0.5, and 1.0) of we. We note that Desai 
and Padmanabhan (2004) use a linear additive demand function to study extended warranty. Our 
choices allow the generalization of their demand function to more complex and realistic 
scenarios. We were able to find analytically tractable optimal solutions for the three models 
corresponding to demand functions (11), (12), and (13). Models for demand function (14) was 
solved numerically (40 test problems for each model with varying range of the parameters b, d, 
and cr or cm). The analyses using each of the above four demand functions yield similar 
qualitative results as those of our original model discussed in Section 4 (i.e. same directional 
results with different values of the threshold parameters). These calculations, once again, suggest 
that the recommendations from our model are quite robust.  
 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have developed game-theoretic models to design extended warranties and 
compared different extended warranty schemes in a supply chain. We first analyzed two EWP 
models with the retailer and the manufacturer, respectively, being the provider of the extended 
warranty. We compared the two models in terms of system profits, retailer profits, manufacturer 
profits, product pricing decisions, and extended warranty decisions. We also compared the two 
models with a centralized system. The main results are as follows. 
• Normally, the manufacturer provides the best extended warranty with respect to the lowest 
extended warranty price per unit length of coverage, unless the retailer’s repair cost is 
substantially higher than the manufacturer’s. 
• The retailer, with a higher rate of profit improvement, benefits more from the extended 
warranty business than the manufacturer, unless he has substantial repair cost disadvantage.  
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• When the repair costs of the two models are equal, model R not only generates a higher 
system profit but also makes a Pareto improvement over model M. This fact arises due to the 
reduced double marginalization in the supply chain.  
We then studied two EWR models where a third party offered the extended warranty, while 
the manufacturer or the retailer simply acted as the extended warranty reseller. Our results show 
that adding a third party provider does not change the dynamics of the system. By comparing the 
corresponding profits of the manufacturer and the retailer between EWP and EWR models, we 
outlined some general guidelines for practitioners as to when a firm should choose to be a 
provider versus a reseller of the extended warranty.  
Our paper makes the following contributions to the operations management literature. First, it 
provides a unique demand function for the extended warranty, which explicitly takes into 
account product demand, product failure, and repair cost. In line with our observation in practice, 
we model the extended warranty as a “service product” with price and time duration for 
coverage. Second, while a majority of the literature in extended warranties focuses on consumer 
moral hazard and heterogeneity issues, our work addresses design issues and their role in channel 
performance. By adopting a game-theoretic approach, we study the strategic interaction between 
the manufacturer and the retailer as well as the interaction between the product sales and the 
extended warranty sales. The main results of our models are able to qualitatively explain some 
observed practices. For example, why do consumer experts always recommend the 
manufacturer’s extended warranties? Why is Chrysler shortening the extended warranty on its 
new vehicles? Third, our model provides a new perspective in distinguishing the extended 
warranty sellers on the market: a provider or a reseller. We also provide guidelines for helping 
make the right choices. Fourth, our model implies that the extended warranty is not merely a 
source of revenue. Because of the unique character of its demand, which is dependent on product 
demand, the extended warranty could be used strategically in channel choices to improve system 
profits and product pricing decisions. These results provide useful insights as well as qualitative 
guidance to practicing managers involved in designing, implementing, and managing an 
extended warranty business. 
Like any other model in operations management literature, our model is based on a set of 
assumptions. For simplicity, we studied the extended warranty business using a monopolistic 
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setting. This allowed us to isolate the impact of the extended warranty on supply chain profits. 
An important extension of our model would be to include competition, either between 
manufacturers or between retailers. Incorporating demand uncertainties might be another useful 
extension. Our model assumes no information asymmetry. In practice, a retailer might have 
private information about consumer demand. In such a scenario, the retailer might use this 
information strategically to improve his profit. We have assumed a one-sided market where the 
demand for the extended warranty is influenced by the product demand but not vice-versa. This 
assumption seems to hold in practice for a wide range of consumer durables ranging from 
domestic appliances to consumer electronics. Retailers such as Wal-Mart and Sam’s Club 
typically do not even pitch the sale of an extended warranty until the checkout. Admittedly, there 
might be scenarios where the availability of an attractive extended warranty will influence the 
product demand as well. Studying extended warranties under such two-sided markets remains 
one of our agendas for future research. 
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Figure 3(a): Comparison of Optimal Product Retail 
Price Between Models 3R and 3M 
 
Figure 3(b): Comparison of Optimal Extended 
Warranty Price Per Unit Length of Time between 
Models 3R and 3M
 
 
Figure 3(c): Comparison of Optimal Profit of Retailer 
Between Models 3R and 3M 
 
 
Figure 3(d): Comparison of Optimal Profit of 
Manufacturer Between Models 3R and 3M 
 
Figure 3(e): Comparison of Optimal Profit of Third 
Party Between Models 3R and 3M 
 
Figure 3(f): Comparison of Optimal Profit Between 
Manufacturer and Retailer in Model 3R  
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Figure 3(g): Comparison of Optimal Profit Between 
Manufacturer and Retailer in Model 3M 
 
Note: We have omitted the curves for b = 0.2 and b = 
1 from Figures 3(f) and 3(g) as the y-axis values are 
substantially higher for these curves. The qualitative 
nature of all curves, however, is similar. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4(a): Comparison with Proposition 2, EW 
Price Per Unit Length of Coverage (c=0.5, d=0.4) 
 
Figure 4(b):  Comparison with Theorem 1, Optimal 
System Profit between Models R and M (d=0.4, 
b=1.01, cr=0.5, cm ranges from 0.05 to 4) 
 
 
Figure 4(c):  Comparison with Proposition 3(a), 
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Figure 4(d):  Comparison with Proposition 3(a), 
Optimal Retailer’s Profit between Models R and M 
(d=0.4, b=1.01, cr=0.5, cm ranges from 0.05 to 4)
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APPENDIX: PROOFS OF RESULTS 
Proof of Proposition 1 
We prove proposition 1 for Model R. The proofs for other two models are similar. Using the 
expressions from Table 1 we get: 
(a) 
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Proof of Proposition 2 
The extended warranty per length prices for model C, model R, and model M are:  
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First, we prove that the extended warranty per length price decreases in ic  , where i = r or m.  
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Second, when 
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)()( , which shows the condition when model R has the lowest per 
length price.  
 
Proof of Theorem 1 
First, we prove that when mr cc = , 
∗∗ > Msys
R
sys .. ππ . 
∗∗ > Msys
R
sys .. ππ  ⇔ 
)12(3))(69120867672()(414720)(69336137733 222223222223 bdccdcdbcbdcdcbdcbb mmmmmmm −−+>−+−  
⇔ 
0)(1399680)(9792911826121 3222223 <−++ dcdcbdcbb mmm , which holds when 
)326.7,0( 2dcb m∈ ; or  
0)(1399680)(9792911826121 3222223 >−++ dcdcbdcbb mmm , which holds when 
]12,326.7[ 22 dcdcb mm∈ . 
 
For any value of cr, we have ∗∗ > Msys
R
sys .. ππ  ⇔ src ∆< , where s∆  is equal to the value of 
δ4)36()1980110(11880238596[
)1609(135
1 224222
22 +−++++⋅+
bdccdcbddcdbcb
dcbd mmmmmm
, 
where =δ  
))36(2711728(360))36(66163(20576 232234 bdccdcdcbbdccdcdbb mmmmmmm −+−+−++ + 
))36(6612514(24300))36(4702601(4725 27352 bdccdcdcbdccdcdbc mmmmmmmm −+−+−+−  
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Next, we prove ms c>∆ : 
When cr = cm, model R has higher system profit than model M. In addition,  
)12(39
])12(3)780(9)293720(6[
23
222242*
.
bdccb
bdccbdcdbdbcdcd
c
rr
rrrrr
r
R
sys
−
−−−+−
=
∂
∂π
 < 0. As cr  
increases, model R’s system profit decreases. When src ∆< , model R’s system profit is lower 
than that of Model M. Obviously s∆  is required to be larger than cm. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
(a)  (i) ∗∗ ≤ Mm
R
m ππ  ⇔ mr cc 3≥ .  
(ii) ∗∗ ≤ Mr
R
r ππ  ⇔ rrc ∆≥ , where  
)288(54
)36(1080)410626480(
22
232242
bdcd
bdccdcbdbcdc
m
rmmmmm
r +
+−+−−
=∆
δ
,  
where =rδ +−−+−+ ])36(6(24)[288(236196
2242 bdccdcdbdcbdc mmmmm  
 2232242 ])36(1080)410626480[( bdccdcbdbcdc mmmmm −+−−  
 
Similar proof as in Theorem 1 for r∆  is larger than mc . 
(b) In model R, ∗∗ > Rr
R
m ππ  ⇔ 
2
2
8.11
16
189 dcdcb rr ≈< ;  
In model M, ∗∗ > Mr
M
m ππ  ⇔ 
2
2
75.33
4
135
dc
dc
b m
m =< . 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Comparing the increasing rate of the system profit between model R and model M, we obtain 
b
b
b
b
M
sys
R
sys
16
3
16
3
16
3
16
3
.. −
>
− ∗∗ ππ
 ⇔ ∗∗ > Msys
R
sys .. ππ  ⇔ src ∆< . The value of s∆  can be found in the 
proof of Theorem 1. The rest of the proofs are straightforward. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
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(a) ∗Mmπ  > 
∗M
m
3π  ⇔ 
]
)128(27
)1806912()144()144(4
,4[ 2
3
22
3
42
3
2
33
2
3
3 bdc
bdbcdcbdccbdcd
cMaxcm −
+−−−−
< . For any value 
of 23144 dcb ≤ , )128(27
)1806912()144()144(4
4 2
3
22
3
42
3
2
33
2
3
3 bdc
bdbcdcbdccbdcd
c
−
+−−−−
≥ , so the 
final condition is 34ccm < . 
(b) ∗Rrπ   < 
∗R
r
3π  ⇔ 
3
222
9
)])12(36(12))12(329([
b
bdccdcdcbdccdcbd rrrrrrr −−+−−  < ∗Rr
3π , ⇔ 
rc < 3∆ , where 3∆ = )116(27
])91()362()272[(
*32
*3*3*3
−
+−−−⋅
R
r
R
r
R
r
R
r
bd
bbbb
π
πππ . 
Note that ∗Rr
3π  = 
3
22
3
2
3
2
3
2342
3
2
3
2
3
2
3
16
])(21636)363(63[)9()9(8
b
dcbdcydcbybybbdcybcdcbybcd −+−+−+−++− , 
and 
Φ
++ΦΦ++−
= 2
2
3
22
3
2
3
2
12
)1178()171(2884
b
dcbdcdbcb
y , where 
3 63
3
42
3
2
3
232
33
63
3
42
3
2
3
23 793152719289458)90(318433098938883788 dcdbcdcbbdcbcddcdbcdcbb −+−−++−−=Φ
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. 
Table 1: Optimal solutions for model C, model R, and model M 
 
Models Model C Model R Model M 
Product 
decisions 
∗p  
2
2 ))9(3(3
b
bdccdcdb mmm −−−  
2
2 ))12(36(
b
bdccdcdb rrr −−−  
2
2 ))36(6(3
b
bdccdcdb mmm −−−  
∗x  N/A 2
2
3
))12(36(22
b
bdccdcdb rrr −−−  
2
2 ))36(6(6
b
bdccdcdb mmm −−−  
Extended 
warranty 
decisions 
∗
ep  2
2 2))9(3(12
b
bbdccdcd mmm −−−
 
2
2
3
2))12(36(8
b
bbdccdcd rrr −−−  2
2 2))36(6(24
b
bbdccdcd mmm −−−
 
∗
ew  
m
mmm
bc
bdccdc )9(3 2 −−  
r
rrr
bc
bdccdc
3
)12(36 2 −−  
m
mmm
bc
bdccdc )36(6 2 −−  
Demands 
∗q  
b
bdccdcd mmm ))9(3(3
2 −−  
b
bdccdcd rrr ))12(36(
2 −−  
b
bdccdcd mmm ))36(6(3
2 −−  
∗
eq  b
bdccdcd mmm ))9(3(
2 −−  
b
bdccdcd rrr
3
))12(36( 2 −−  
b
bdccdcd mmm ))36(6(
2 −−  
 
 
Optimal profits: 
Model C 
Profit 
∗C
sys.π  3
222 )])9(3(18))9(29([
b
bdccdcdcbdccdcbd mmmmmmm −−−−−  
Model R 
Profits 
∗R
sys.π  3
222
9
)])12(36(60))12(3863([
b
bdccdcdcbdccdcbd rrrrrrr −−−−−  
∗R
rπ  3
222
9
)])12(36(12))12(329([
b
bdccdcdcbdccdcbd rrrrrrr −−+−−  
∗R
mπ  3
222
3
)])12(36(24))12(3218([
b
bdccdcdcbdccdcbd rrrrrrr −−−−−  
Model M 
Profits 
∗M
sys.π  3
222 )])36(6(36))36(29([
b
bdccdcdcbdccdcbd mmmmmmm −−+−−  
∗M
rπ  3
22 ])36(6(12[9
b
bdccdcdbdc mmmm −−+−  
∗M
mπ  3
222 )])36(6(72))36(9(2[
b
bdccdcdcbdccdcbd mmmmmmm −−−−−  
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Table 2: Optimal solutions for model 3R and model 3M 
 
Models Model 3R Model 3M 
Product 
decisions 
∗p  
2
2
3
22
3
2
3
4
)183()9(6
b
dcbxbbdcxbcd −++−+  
2
2
33
2
3 )144(672
b
bdccddcb −+−  
∗x  
Φ
++ΦΦ++−
2
2
3
22
3
2
3
2
12
)1178()171(2884
b
dcbdcdbcb  
2
2
33
2
3 )144(12144
b
bdccddcb −+−  
Extended 
warranty 
decisions 
∗
ep  
3
2
3
2
3
22
3
22
3
2
4
)72(9)24(
cdb
cddcbxbbdcxbdcbxb +−+−+−−  
2
2
33
2
3 ])144(24288[10
b
bdccddcb −−+−⋅  
∗
ex  
3
2
3
2
3
22
3
22
3
2
4
)36(9)12(
cdb
cddcbxbbdcxbdcbxb −−−−+−−  
2
2
33
2
3 ])144(24288[8
b
bdccddcb −−+−⋅  
∗
ew  
3
2
3
2
3 93
cb
bdcxbcd −+−  
3
2
333 ])144(12[2
bc
bdccdc −−⋅  
Demands 
∗q  
)9(4
)3677(9)12(
2
3
2
3
3
2
3
22
3
22
3
2
bdcxbdcb
cddcbxbbdcxbdcbxb
−++
+−−−+++−  
b
bdccddc ])144(12[6 233
2
3 −−⋅  
∗
eq  )9(2
)926(
2
3
2
3
3
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
bdcxbdcb
cdbdcxbcddcbxb
−++
⋅−++−+−  
b
bdccddc )144(12 233
2
3 −−  
Profits 
∗
.sysπ  *2*3*** )( eee qwcpqp −+  3
2
333
22
33
2 ])144(24288[108
b
bdccdcdcbcd −−+−⋅  
∗
rπ  
****** )()( eee qxpqxp −+−   3
2
333
22
33
2 ])144(24288[36
b
bdccdcdcbcd −−+−⋅  
∗
mπ  **qx  3
2
33
2
3
32
33 ])144()144(172818[4
b
bdccbdcdcdbcd −−+−⋅  
∗
3π  
*2*
3
* )( eee qwcx −   3
2
33
2
3
32
33 ])144()576(691236[4
b
bdccbdcdcdbcd −−−+−⋅  
Note: The expressions for optimal solutions for model 3R are rather complicated. We have only provided the 
expression of the optimal wholesale product price *3Rx  in Table 2, where 
3 63
3
42
3
2
3
232
33
63
3
42
3
2
3
23 793152719289458)90(318433098938883788 dcdbcdcbbdcbcddcdbcdcbb −+−−++−−=Φ
 
The optimal values of other variables have been expressed in terms of *3Rx . 
 
 
